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Abstract: In this article – which may look like a collage of quotations – I aim at mentioning the 
opinions of some famous linguists with regard to the so called ―unconsciousness‖ of common 
speakers manifested within the linguistic activity as such (that is during the process of 
communication). Consequently, I will present the ideas of some American linguists (E. Sapir, L. 
Bloomfield and Ch. Hockett), taking into account both the opinions of certain European forerunners 
(H. Paul and F. de Saussure), and the subsequent criticism formulated by E. Coseriu concerning the 
respective linguistic ―unconsciousness‖. 
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1. In this article I will try to present and analyze mainly some introductory remarks 
from linguistic treatises – highly influential at that time – of certain famous 
American linguists: Edward Sapir (Language, 1921), Leonard Bloomfield 
(Language, 1933) and Charles F. Hockett (A Course in Modern Linguistics, 1958). 
At first sight, while characterizing language or speech, the three of them seem to 
state the same thing. They all give the impression that they see language as an 
activity as natural as walking, breathing or the beating of our hearts. Thus, they 
intend to transmit the idea that speaking is an ―unconscious‖ activity. However, if 
we scan the texts more carefully, we will observe from these very first sentences 
some differences which reflect the specific linguistic conception of each of them. 
2. Leonard Bloomfield‘s linguistic treatise Language (published in 1933) starts 
with the following words: ―Language plays a great part in our life. Perhaps 
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because of its familiarity, we rarely observe it, taking it rather for granted, as we 
do breathing or walking.‖ (Bloomfield, 2005, p. 3) By using the analogy between 
language and breathing or walking, Bloomfield undoubtedly refers to the beginning 
of Edward Sapir‘s treatise, published 12 years earlier, which reads: ―Speech is so 
familiar a feature of daily life that we rarely pause to define it. It seems as natural 
to man as walking, and only less so than breathing‖ (Sapir, 1921, p. 3). 
2.1. From the above mentioned quotation, we can notice that Sapir makes a certain 
distinction between ―walking‖ and ―breathing‖. Thus, according to Sapir, the two 
activities are not perfect equivalents (since walking, unlike breathing, is learnt), as 
Bloomfield seems to consider them. Nevertheless, Sapir aims to demonstrate that 
„language [is] a cultural, not a biologically inherited, function‖ (Sapir, 1921, p. 
vii). Consequently, ―The process of acquiring speech is, in sober fact, an utterly 
different sort of thing from the process of learning to walk‖ (Sapir, 1921, p. 3) . 
2.2. These differences made by Sapir no longer interest Bloomfield in 1933, for he 
became, in the meantime, an advocate of behaviorism (in a very strict form) and, at 
the same time, a critic of mentalism. That is why, he refutes introspection, by 
declaring that he will study language only to the extent in which its manifestations 
are observable (see Bloomfield, 2005, p. vii-viii). In his opinion, only in this 
manner will linguistics obtain the right to be considered truly a science.
1
 In a brief 
subsequent paper, Linguistic Aspects of Science (1939), Bloomfield supports the 
same conception: ―In the common sense of many peoples, perhaps of all, language 
is largely ignored, and its effects are explained as owing to non-physical factors, 
the action of a «mind», «will», or the like. These terms, as well as the many others 
                                                          
1 Eugenio Coseriu criticized in detail Bloomfield‘s conception in his study Forma y sustancia en los 
sonidos del lenguaje (1954). I quote here an excerpt from his argumentation: ―Ahora, el negar la 
mente, por no tratarse de una cosa perteneciente al mundo (o reducirla a actos físicos), es una 
decisión arbitraria que tiene el mismo carácter «metafísico» y convencional de la decisión contraria: 
la de negar las cosas del mundo porque no pertenecen a la mente (o reducirlas a actos mentales). En 
realidad, no es de ningún modo necesario entender el espíritu o la mente como sustancias metafísicas 
para reconocer el carácter «espiritual» de ciertas actividades o la interioridad, la no-mundanidad de la 
conciencia (que sólo significa reconocer la distinción entre sujeto y objeto, condición ineludible de 
nuestro conocimiento). El espíritu puede concebirse simplemente como concepto, y no objeto: como 
un concepto deducido de ciertas actividades, el principio único a cual las reducimos para entenderlas 
como unidad (o como el conjunto de estas mismas actividades). Del mismo modo, la mente puede 
entenderse como puro concepto, como nombre de la interioridad de la conciencia (del sujeto como 
no-integrante del objeto), aunque se pueda demonstrar que también tal interioridad es de carácter 
físico. No se puede negar tal interioridad con el pretexto de que acerca de su existencia sólo tenemos 
las pruebas ofrecidas por la experiencia corriente (por la «popular view»), porque acerca de las cosas 
del mundo no tenemos otras pruebas que las de esta misma experiencia: «se dice» que existen las 
cosas del mismo modo que «se dice» que existe la mente‖ (Coseriu, 1967, p. 136). 
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connected with them, yield service in daily life, in art, and in religion; that they 
have no place in science is the contention of many scientists‖ (Bloomfield, 1939, 
pp. 12-13). 
2.3. An entire different conception is that of Bloomfield in 1914, when he 
published his first version of his treatise titled An Introduction to the Study of 
Language. Influenced, at that time, by W. Wundt‘s psychology (see also 
Bloomfield, 1933, p. vii), the American linguist did not refrain in those years from 
using the term introspection, as noticed from the first sentences of the third 
chapter, The Mental Basis of Language
1
, from the above mentioned book: 
„Language plays a very important part in most of our mental processes, few of 
which, indeed, are entirely free from linguistic elements. [...] In short, a very little 
introspection shows that nearly all of our mental life contains speech-elements‖ 
(Bloomfield, 1914, p. 56).
2
 
3. Mention must be made that there is a European tradition in this regard. The 
American linguists referred to above undoubtedly knew, for instance, Hermann 
Paul and Ferdinand de Saussure‘s works of reference in which they had discussed, 
in their epoch, about the so called ―unconsciousness‖ of speakers. 
3.1. Thus, Hermann Paul, the German Neogrammarian linguist, in his famous 
book, Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte (1880), referring mainly to phonetic 
changes, distinguished more ―degrees of consciousness‖ (see Paul, 1891, pp. 36-
64). For a start, he makes a general remark, concerning the automatism of highly 
practiced activities: ―It rather lies in the nature of the psychical organisation that all 
ideas which originally operated merely by consciousness receive by practice the 
capacity of operating automatically; and that this automatic operation is the first 
and indispensable condition of the speedy course of ideas demanded in every 
position of daily life and in language as well‖ (Paul, 1891, p. 41).3 Then, H. Paul 
                                                          
1 In 1943, when Louis Hjelmslev published his most important book in Danish (known mainly in its 
English version, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language), he clearly stated the mental nature of 
language: ―But language is no external accompaniment. It lies deep in the mind of man, a wealth of 
memories inherited by the individual and the tribe, a vigilant conscience that reminds and warns.‖ 
(Hjelmslev, 1963, p. 3). 
2 Let us record the variations of expression that Bloomfield makes along the years on one of his 
introductory statements: „Language plays a very important part in most of our mental processes...‖ 
(Bloomfield, 1914, p. 56); ―Language plays a great part in our life.‖ (Bloomfield, 2005, p. 3); 
―Language plays a very important part in science‖ (Bloomfield, 1939, p. 1). 
3 Six decades later, L. Hjelmslev, the Danish linguist, would support the same idea: ―…it is in the 
nature of language to be overlooked, to be a means and not an end, and it is only by artifice that the 
searchlight can be directed on the means of knowledge itself. This is true in daily life, where 
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discusses about those linguistic moments or events which make the speaker pass 
from the state of ―unconsciousness‖ to that of ―consciousness‖: ―On the other hand, 
however, the unconsciousness of the elements does not exclude an exact control 
over them. We may utter or hear a group of sounds to which we are accustomed 
without ever thinking that it is in fact precisely this group, made up in such and 
such a way; but as soon as in a single element a departure from the usual is 
observed – which departure needs to be but very slight – it is noticed, unless indeed 
any extraordinary obstacles supervene to prevent it; and each departure from the 
accustomed unconscious course of ideas naturally forces itself upon our 
consciousness. Of course it does not follow that, with the consciousness of the 
departure, the consciousness of its nature and cause is also given‖ (Paul, 1891, pp. 
41-42). 
3.2. Ferdinand de Saussure, the Swiss linguist, in his Cours de linguistique 
générale (published posthumously in 1916), is less subtle than Hermann Paul, 
pretending that the common speakers ―are largely unconscious of the laws of 
language‖: ―On ajouterait que la réflexion n’intervient pas dans la pratique d’un 
idiome; que les sujets sont, dans une large mesure, inconscients des lois de la 
langue; et s‘ils ne s‘en rendent pas compte, comment pourraient-ils les modifier? 
Fussent-ils même conscients, il faudrait se rappeler que les faits linguistiques ne 
provoquent guère la critique, en ce sens que chaque peuple est généralement 
satisfait de la langue qu‘il a reçue‖ (Saussure, 1955, p. 106)1. A page further, he 
resumes the same idea: ―Une langue constitue un système. [...] Car ce système est 
un mécanisme complexe; l‘on ne peut le saisir que par la réflexion; ceux-là mêmes 
qui en font un usage journalier l‘ignorent profondément‖ (Saussure, 1955, p. 107).2 
4. Let us now return to the American tradition. It is well known that Bloomfield‘s 
treatise Language (1933) highly influenced the American linguistics from the next 
decades (overshadowing, unfortunately, Sapir‘s Language). Such a major influence 
was acknowledged by Charles F. Hockett, another great American linguist, whose 
                                                                                                                                                   
language normally does not come to consciousness; but it is equally true in scientific research‖ 
(Hjelmslev, 1963, p. 5). 
1 In translation: ―Again, it might be added that reflection does not enter into the active use of an idiom 
– speakers are largely unconscious of the laws of language; and if they are unaware of them, how 
could they modify them? Even if they were aware of these laws, we may be sure that their awareness 
would seldom lead to criticism, for people are generally satisfied with the language they have 
received‖ (Saussure, 1959, p. 72). 
2 In translation: ―A language constitutes a system. [...] The system is a complex mechanism that can 
be grasped only through reflection; the very ones who use it daily are ignorant of it‖ (Saussure, 1959, 
p. 73). 
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massive handbook, A Course in Modern Linguistics (1958), opens with the 
following words: ―This book is about language, the most valuable single 
possession of the human race. Everyone, in every walk of life, is concerned with 
language in a practical way, for we make use of it in virtually everything we do. 
For the most part our use of language is so automatic and natural that we pay no 
more attention to it than we do to our breathing or to the beating of our hearts‖ 
(Hockett, 1958, p. 1).
1
 
4.1. Unlike his notorious American forerunners, after having remarked himself the 
―automatism‖ of linguistic activities, Hockett mentions the moments when 
speakers become ―conscious‖ of the way language works: ―But sometimes our 
attention is drawn: we are struck by the fact that others do not speak quite as we 
do, or we observe a child learning to talk, or we wonder whether one or another 
way of saying or writing is correct‖ (Hockett, 1958, p. 1). As seen, he refers to the 
manner in which speakers relate (as receivers), most often critically, to the others‘ 
speech. 
4.2. Otherwise, Hockett affirms (just as H. Paul and F. de Saussure) that ―...native 
control of a language does not in itself imply conscious understanding of how the 
language works, or ability to teach it – any more than having cancer automatically 
makes one a specialist in cancer diagnosis and therapy‖ (Hockett, 1958, p. 2). We 
must admit, however, that Hockett‘s analogy between the fact of knowing a 
language (as mother tongue) and the fact of suffering from a serious disease is not 
the most appropriate. 
5. Referring to what H. Paul and F. de Saussure said, Eugenio Coseriu always 
showed an adversity against using terms as unconscious and unconsciousness when 
characterizing the common linguistic activity (see Coseriu, 1958, pp. 32-35 and 
Coseriu, 1992, pp. 214-234). Following Aristotle and Leibniz, he considers that 
linguistic knowledge is a ―technical‖ knowledge (cf. O.Gr. téchne), a ―know how‖ 
(cf. Munteanu, 2017, pp. 204-206); accordingly, speaking as such can never be an 
unconscious activity: ―Considerado en su índole, el saber lingüístico es un saber 
hacer, es decir, un saber técnico. A veces se pretende que el hablar es un actividad 
«inconsciente» o que los hablantes «no tienen conciencia» de las normas de la 
lengua que hablan [...]; pero ésta es una idea infeliz y contradictoria, que debe 
                                                          
1 Also cf. John Dewey‘s observation regarding the similarly ―natural‖ way in which thought works: 
―No one can tell another person in any definite way how he should think, any more than how he ought 
to breathe or to have his blood circulate‖ (Dewey, 1989, p. 113). 
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desecharse. Una actividad no-patológica de la conciencia despierta no es y no 
puede ser «inconsciente»‖ (Coseriu, 1958, p. 32).  
5.1. What is more, the Romanian linguist makes a clear distinction between ―to 
know how to use the linguistic instrument‖ and ―to understand the linguistic 
instrument used‖. In other words, this is the distinction between the knowledge of 
the speaker and the knowledge of the linguist: ―La verdad es que los hablantes 
tienen plena conciencia del sistema y de las llamadas «leyes de la lengua». No sólo 
saben qué dicen, sino también cómo se dice (y cómo no se dice); de otro modo no 
podrían siquiera hablar. Es cierto, por otra parte, que no se trata de la 
«comprender» el instrumento lingüístico (que es asunto del lingüista), sino de 
saber emplearlo, de saber mantener (rehacer) la norma y crear de acuerdo con el 
sistema‖ (Coseriu, 1958, p. 34). 
5.2. In addition, when trying to explain certain linguistic facts, the common speaker 
himself can make mistakes frequently, becoming a ―naive linguist‖. According to 
Coseriu, the common speaker can offer only the first justifications; his reflexive 
knowledge is insufficient (it is a cognitio clara distincta inadaequata, in Leibniz‘s 
classification; cf. Coseriu, 1992, p. 230). On the contrary, the reflexive knowledge 
of the linguist tends to offer the final justifications. 
6. Despite the criticism formulated by Coseriu, the problem of linguistic 
―unconsciousness‖ is far from being fully clarified. The confusions are generated 
by the ambiguity of the term consciousness itself, which may have multiple 
significations (sometimes depending on various philosophical or psychological 
schools). That is why I intend to analyze, in a future article, the way in which John 
Dewey discusses about the concept of ―consciousness‖ in relation with language 
(and especially with different aspects of meaning). 
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